

MEANS-ENDS EPISTEMOLOGY
ASSIGNMENT #1

Deadline: **Thursday June 2**, before class.

- (1) Inductive skepticism is the view that one can have no justification for believing hypotheses that are locally underdetermined by the available data. Must a means-ends epistemologist (logical reliabilist) be committed to inductive skepticism? Why (not)?
- (2) The notions of verifiability and falsifiability are central to early logical empiricism and to Karl Popper's philosophy of science, respectively. Discuss the differences between the role verifiability and falsifiability play in these respective traditions and in means-ends epistemology.
- (3) Prove Proposition 3.12 parts (a), (c), and (d.3) in the book.
- (4) Solve Exercise 3.1 parts (c), (e), and (a) in the book. (Note that you can visualize the data generation by the modified IRBP accelerator as the construction of a tree like in Figs. 3.28–29, where each new data item adds finitely many (possibly 0) children to a leaf node in the tree so far. Hypotheses (collections of data streams) are assertions about the ultimate shape of the tree.)